1 Definitions of definability and expressibility will be provided in due course. For the time being, suffices to say that a theory defines truth iff it proves every instance of T, and that it expresses truth iff every such instance is true.
2 See McGee (1991: 44-5) and Field (2008) . Field writes that while '[t]ruth can't possibly be given an extensionally correct definition within the language, . . . validity presumably can' (Field 2008: 127) . What he means by that is that one can define the set of validities, without necessarily thereby defining the concept of validity. Kreisel's Squeezing Argument may then reassure us that standard model-theoretic definitions of first-order logical validity are extensionally adequate (Kreisel 1967) ; see also Field (2008: Ch. 2 
.2). McGee's and
Field's view express current logical orthodoxy, although the unorthodox view defended here, viz. that truth and validity are both paradox-prone semantic notions, is by no means new. For a representative sample of the literature, see e.g. Priest and Routley (1982) , Read (1979) , Read (2001) and, more recently, Shapiro (2011) and Beall and Murzi (2013) .
(at least) implicitly accept at that time (Field 1994: 401-5) . We can then put our model to work, and ask: what can it say about logical validity? Ketland (2012) has recently pointed out that PA already has the resources to derive the following principles about a predicate Val(x) intuitively reading 5 'x is logically valid' (so that Val(n) is true iff n is the code of a valid L Asentence):
(V-Intro) Given a logical derivation of , infer Val(01); The above principles can be easily generalized by means of a two-place predicate Val(x, y) expressing argument-validity, where x is to be replaced by (the code of) the conjunction of the premises of a given argument. Not only can PA, and hence our maximal theory, talk about numbers (and its own syntax): it can also talk, and prove intuitive principles, about logical 15 validity.
To be sure, the extension of 'logically valid' will depend on one's view about what counts as logical. While arguably 6, _, !, :, 9, 8 and ¼ are logical and terms such as 'water' are not, the status of semantic predicates such as 'true' and 'valid' is less clear. According to Priest (2007: 193) , the 20 T-Scheme (TS) 'ought . . . to be considered part of logic', essentially on the grounds that its instances are analytic of 'true'. The view is controversial, however. As Cook (2012: 235) has recently observed, if 'logical truth requires that uniform substitution instances of logical truths [be] logical truths', some instances of (TS) are not logically valid. 25 The issue, though, is largely terminological. Thus, McGee recommends that we use a broader notion of logical validity, while acknowledging that the notion does not coincide with pure logical validity:
we must employ a richer notion of logical necessity, according to which there are certain sentences whose truth is so basic to our way 30 of thinking and talking that they have the same epistemic status as logical validities, even though they are not actually logically valid. (McGee 1991: 43) In a similar spirit, Field (2007: 99) suggests that we use 'the term ''valid'' . . . in a very broad sense, one which counts . . . a large amount of 35 set theory and the basic principles of truth and satisfaction as valid'. I will distinguish, then, between logical validity and validity (tout court). I mention two reasons why the distinction must be made.
First, it might be argued that there are clear examples of arguments that are valid, albeit not logically so. A first (admittedly controversial) example is given by the !-rule: 0 has property F 5 1 has property F, 2 has property F, . . . Every number has property F.
Many would think that the rule is intuitively valid. 5 Yet, the rule is invalid in 10 first-order logic. 6, 7 Less controversially, other examples of valid but not logically valid arguments include analytic validities such as the following:
x is a brother x is male
where S(x) expresses the successor function. To be sure, one might point out that such rules would be logically valid if we held fixed the interpretation of
15
'brother', 'male', 'successor' and numerals. However, the dialectic here is a familiar one: intuitively invalid inferences such as hLeslie was a US president ; Leslie was a mani, and intuitively invalid sentences such as 'There are at least two numbers', would thereby be declared logically valid (Etchemendy 1990 Tarski (1983: 411) , Etchemendy (1990) and McGee (2011: 33) .
6 First-order logic is compact: an argument is valid in first-order logic if and only if some finite sub-argument is valid.
7 There at least two ways of validating the !-rule. First, one could allow infinitary quantifiers, such as 'there are infinitely many x such that . . .'. Then, fF(0), F(1), F(2), . . . } would imply that there are infinitely many Fs. The resulting system would be semantically incomplete, but it might be thought that this is not a problem. Relatedly, one could simply point out that the !-rule is valid in second-order logic (with standard semantics). Here I do not have space to discuss either option, and simply observe that both are themselves controversial. For a criticism of infinitary quantifiers, see Hanson (1997: 391-2) .
8 Again, I do not have space here to fully defend the claim that Tarski's account of validity cannot handle analytic validities. This is a large issue related to the even larger issue whether, as forcefully argued by Etchemendy (1990 Etchemendy ( , 2008 ), Tarski's account undergenerates. For more discussion on analytic validity and the issue of under generation, see e.g. Priest (1995: 288) and Etchemendy (2008: 278 and ff) .
Second, as hinted in the above McGee quote, validity arguably has a role to play in our epistemic lives. Harman (1986: 18) suggests that ordinary reasoning is partly governed by the following principles:
Recognized Implication Principle. One has a reason to believe if one 5 recognizes that is implied by one's view.
Recognized Inconsistency Principle. One has a reason to avoid believing things one recognizes to be inconsistent.
Similarly, Field advocates the existence of a connection between validity and correct reasoning, this time framed in terms of degrees of belief. Where P() 10 refers to one's degrees of belief in , Field's principle reads: (F) If it's obvious that 1 , . . . , n together entail , then one ought to impose the constraint that P( ) is to be at least (Harman 1986: 17) . Hence, if the principles apply at all, they apply to validity. As Harman (2009: 334) puts it, 'since there seems to be nothing special about logical implications and inconsistencies, . . . there seems to be no significant way in which logic might be specially relevant to reasoning'. Logical validity is not specially relevant to reasoning. But validity arguably is.
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What, then, is validity? One standard view sees consequence as a kind of modality. For some understanding of 'possible', a set of premises entails a given conclusion iff it is impossible that all the premises are true and the conclusion false:
Truth-preservation view. An argument hÀ;bi is valid iff it is impossible 30 that every member of À is true but b is false.
The view accommodates the examples of pp. 3-4, but has recently come under attack, chiefly on the grounds that the very claim that valid arguments preserve truth (i) entails Curry-driven triviality and (ii) is inconsistent with Gö del's Second Incompleteness Theorem (Priest 2006a,b; Field 2008 Field , 2009 35 Beall 2009). 10 However, the results to be presented below do not require that valid arguments be truth-preserving-they are indeed compatible with views that reject this assumption. One such view is endorsed by Field (2008 Field ( , 2009 ).
According to Field, validity is a primitive notion whose role is to constrain belief, and degrees of belief, via principles such as (F):
Normative view. Validity normatively constrains our degrees of belief. Now for some well-known, and less well-known, theorems. 
Validity curry
While V-Intro is adequate for a predicate expressing logical validity, it does not seem adequate for a predicate expressing validity. Suppose has been derived by means of rules that are themselves valid. Then, we would like to be able to say that is itself valid. That is, the following rule should be in place:
The rule is intuitively valid. On the truth-preservation view, it states that sentences proved only by means of necessarily truth-preserving rules are themselves necessary. On the normative view, it effectively says that, if we have proved by means of valid rules, then, if we have thereby come to 15 believe to degree 1, then we should also believe Val(01) to degree 1. Unlike V-Intro and V-Out, however, V-Intro Ã and V-Out (with 'Val(x)' now taken to express validity) spell trouble.
Theorem 1 (Myhill 1960; Kaplan and Montague 1960) . Let T be a theory which (i) interprets Q, (ii) proves all instances of V-Out and (iii) is closed
Proof. We reason in T. The Diagonal Lemma yields a sentence k such that k$: Val(0k1). We assume Val(0k1) and derive :Val(0k1) by applications of V-Out and $-E. Hence, :Val(0k1). But, then, k follows on no assumptions 25 and must therefore be valid. Contradiction.
oe
In effect, the above reasoning-the Knower Paradox-is but a stronger Liar: it is the same paradox, except that the left-to-right direction of (TS) is replaced by the weaker V-Intro Ã . 13 Standard treatments of the Liar paradox 11 This is, in effect, a notational variant of the unrestricted Rule of Necessitation: given a derivation of , infer Tr(01).
12 The reasoning displayed in this proof is sometimes referred to as the Pseudo-Scotus Paradox. It might be objected that Q's axioms and V-Intro Ã are logically invalid. See e.g. Field (2008: 304 and 306) , Ketland (2012) and Cook (forthcoming) . However, the assumption that they are valid is plausible on any interesting weakening of the notion of logical validity. For more discussion, see Murzi and Shapiro (forthcoming) .
13 To see this, note that both paradoxes have the same general form: from some such that 7$:h(01), one proves :h(01), and hence , on the assumption that h(01). Then, h(01) follows on no assumptions via either the T-Scheme or Necessitation, depending on whether h is interpreted as, respectively, 'true' or 'valid'. still apply, however. On paracomplete treatments, one may not validly infer :Val(0k1) from a derivation of absurdity from Val(0k1), i.e. the rule of negation introduction is rejected as (logically) invalid (see e.g. Kripke 1975; Brady 2006; Field 2008; Horsten 2009 ). On paraconsistent treatments, the 5 above argument shows the existence of a true contradiction, viz. Val(0k1) 6: Val(0k1) (see e.g. Priest 2006b; Beall 2009). Now suppose we'd like to attribute validity not only to sentences but also to arguments. We'd then introduce in the language (at least) a two-place validity predicate Val(x, y) governed by the following rules: More formally:
VP is, again, intuitively valid. On the truth-preservation view, it states that, if 15 has been derived from by means of truth-preserving rules, then the argument h; i is necessarily truth-preserving. On the normative view, it effectively says that, if has been derived from by means of valid rules, then the argument h; i is valid, and hence P() P( ). VD is also compelling on both views. On the truth-preservation view, it implies that, if we are in 20 a position to assert that the argument h; i is truth-preserving, then we may infer given . On the normative view, it tells us that, if we are in a position to assert that the argument h; i is valid, then P() P( ).
Note that VP and VD are generalizations of, respectively, V-Intro Ã and V-Out. To see this, it is sufficient to instantiate VP and VD using a constant 25 T expressing valid truth. Instantiating VP yields a notational variant of V-Intro Ã , rewritten using our two place predicate Val(x, y) in place of a one-place validity predicate Val(x):
Likewise, instantiating VD thus
yields a notational variant of a rule corresponding to the T axiom for a necessity operator, i.e. V-Out
It is therefore no surprise that VP and VD also spell trouble. What is surpris-35 ing is the minimal logical resources required to show this: one only needs to assume the validity of the standardly accepted structural rules, viz. Identity, Contraction and Cut:
The proof is a validity-involving version of Curry's Paradox: Validity Curry 5 or v-Curry, for short.
14 Theorem 2. Let T be any theory which interprets Q and is closed under VP, VD, Id and SContr. Then, T is trivial.
15
Proof. The Diagonal Lemma yields a sentence , which intuitively says of 10 itself, up to equivalence, that it validly entails that you will win the lottery:
Let AE now be the following derivation of the further theorem Val(01, 0o1):
Using AE, we can then 'prove' that you will win the lottery: 15 oe In short: validity, just like truth, is plagued by paradox. More precisely, since VP and VD are generalizations of the validity rules that yield the Knower Paradox, the v-Curry Paradox is a generalization of the Knower Paradox, 20 which, recall, is but a stronger Liar.
14 To the best of my knowledge, the first known occurrence of v-Curry paradox is in the 16th-century author Jean de Celaya. See Read (2001: fn. 11 and 12) and references therein. Albert of Saxony discusses a contrapositive version of the paradox in his Insolubles (Read 2010: 211) . More recent versions surface in Whittle (2004: fn. 3), Clark (2007: 234-5) and Shapiro (2011: fn. 29) . For a first comprehensive discussion of the v-Curry Paradox, see Beall and Murzi (2013) .
15 It is worth noting that Cut is effectively built in our formulation of VD. Hence, should the latter rule be formulated differently, Cut may need to be mentioned alongside Id and SContr in the statement of Theorem 2 below.
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Parenthetical note. Theorem 2 can be strengthened. While the theorem assumes that Q be valid in the target sense, this assumption is not strictly needed, as Cook (forthcoming) has recently pointed out.
Theorem 3 (Cook) . If VP and VD are valid, Q is trivial.
5
Proof. Let Q Ã be the conjunction of Q's axioms. Using the Diagonal Lemma, we can derive
We then 'prove' Val(0k6Q Ã ! o1) and, from this, conclude Q Ã 7o oe
10
Beyond Id, SContr and Cut, 16 all is needed for deriving the Validity Curry is that VP and VD be valid. It immediately follows from Theorem 2 and 3 that theories of semantic paradox which retain the standard structural rulesincluding the standard paracomplete and paraconsistent ones-still validate 15 the v-Curry Paradox. Such theories can in general express sentence validity, but they are unable to express argument validity. For more discussion, see Zardini (2011), Beall and Murzi (2013) and Murzi (2012) . End note. 
Validity and expressibility
The results of Section 2 suggest natural generalizations of ability and inexpressibility of truth theorems. I will closely follow, mutatis mutandis, Peter Smith's presentation of Tarski's original results (Smith 2007: 180-2) . As above, we will take some (possibly not recursively axiomatisable) theory T which interprets PA to represent our maximal theory at a certain time, and hence the consequence relation of our language at that time. That 25 is, ignoring for simplicity's sake the relativization to time, we will effectively assume that T's consequence relation is the consequence relation of our maximal theory, so that T is, so to speak, validity sound and complete. In short: 7 T iff entails .
We can now show that T can neither define, nor express, validity. To this 30 end, we make use of the two following (standard) definitions:
Definition 4 (Definability). È(x, y) defines a binary relation R in T iff: mRn iff 7 T Èðm; nÞ, where m and n are names of, respectively, m and m. Note that, given our idealizing assumption that T is validity sound and complete, it follows from Definitions 5 and 6 that Val(x, y) is a formal validity predicate iff Val(x, y) expresses T's consequence relation. More for- 20 mally, Val(x, y) is a formal validity predicate iff: Val(01, 0 1) is true iff 7 T . Furthermore, on the foregoing assumption, T is a validity theory iff the following holds: 7 T iff 7 T Val(01, 0 1). That is, if T is validity sound and complete, T is a validity theory iff it is closed under the naı¨ve validity rules: 
25
We are now ready to introduce our main results. Can T define its own consequence relation, i.e. can T contain its own validity definition? This question is answered in the negative by the following theorem.
30
Theorem 8 (Indefinability of 7 T in T). Let T be any non-trivial theory which interprets Q with language L V including a fresh predicate Val(x, y). Then, T cannot define its own consequence relation.
Proof. Since T is at least as strong as Q, the Diagonal Lemma applies and 35 gives us a sentence -a v-Curry sentence!-such that 7 T $Val(01, 0o1).
However, since T defines its own consequence relation, T validates VP and VD. Hence, we can run the v-Curry reasoning in T and conclude 7 T o, which contradicts our assumption that T is not trivial. oe the inexpressibility of validity | 9
It immediately follows that, if T is validity sound and complete, then T cannot define validity.
Corollary 9 (Indefinability of validity). Let T be as above. Then, if T is validity sound and complete, T cannot define validity.
5
Proof. This follows at once from Theorem 8 and the observation that, if T is validity sound and complete, T defines validity iff it validates VP and VD. oe
10
Can at least T express validity? This question must also receive a negative answer, provided Q is sound. The proof makes use in the metalanguage of disquotational truth-predicate, i.e. we assume that, for all 2 L V , is true iff , where 'true' = 2 L V . 18 It also assumes that our meta-theory validates the standard structural rules, and that the metalanguage entailment connective we 15 have been using so far satisfies (a version of) conditional proof and modus ponens, i.e. that, for all , 2 L V , if there is a derivation of from in the metatheory, then entails , and if and entails , then , where 'entails' = 2L V .
Theorem 10 (Inexpressibility of validity). Let T be any non-trivial theory

20
which interprets Q, with language L V . Then, if Q is sound, T cannot contain a predicate expressing validity.
Proof. Let T be a theory that interprets Q, and suppose there is a L V predicate Val(x, y) expressing validity. We then have:
However, (the subtheory of T which interprets) Q is ex hypothesi sound. So
$Val(01, 0o1).
Since Val(x, y) expresses validity, the following holds:
3. entails o iff Val(01, 0o1) is true. 30 We can now reason the standard Curry way. We assume and derive that entails o from 2 and 3. Assuming again , we derive o and, discharging both occurrences of , we deduce that entails o. From 2 and 3, we conclude o. oe
35
Notice that the multiple discharge of is effectively equivalent to assuming that SContr holds (see e.g. Negri and von Plato 2001: Ch. 8 ).
We are now confronted with a familiar dilemma: either we invalidate one of the naïve validity principles at work in the foregoing proofs, or, if T is to either define or express validity, T's logic must be (radically) weakened: one among Id, SContr and Cut must go. 
Incompleteness and classical validity
It might be objected that the foregoing results are inconsistent with both Gö del's Second Incompleteness Theorem and Lö b's Theorem and that, for this reason, our definitions of a formal validity predicate and of a validity theory must be incorrect. The Second Incompleteness Theorem states that 10 no consistent recursively axiomatized theory T which interprets Q and is strong enough to prove the Hilbert-Bernays conditions for a predicate Prov T expressing provability-in-T can prove its own consistency. 19 Lo¨b's Theorem is a formalized version of Curry's Paradox, which, as it turns out, entails the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Where T is as above,
15
Lo¨b's Theorem states that, if 7 T Prov T (01) ! , then 7 T .
In a nutshell, one might use Gö del's and Lö b's results to argue against VD thus. Consider the following version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Theorem 11. Let T be any recursively axiomatized theory that interprets Q, and let Prov T (x) be a provability predicate for T. Suppose T asserts that 20 theorems of T are valid and that validity is factive:
It follows by Lö b's Theorem that T is trivial.
25
Proof. Suppose T derives both 1 and 2. Then, since Prov T (01) ! follows from 1 and 2 by the transitivity of ! , T also derives Prov T (01) ! . By Lö b's Theorem, T derives . oe
30
That this is in effect the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be seen by contraposing the proof while setting 9 0 6 ¼ 1. We can now derive the following corollary.
Corollary 12. Let T be as above and suppose T is closed under VD. Then, T is trivial.
35
Proof. One need only notice that VD entails V-Out (see Section 2). Then, the result immediately follows from Theorem 10. oe
Have we shown that VD must be rejected? I think not, but let us first examine the main assumption on which the arguments depends. The argument assumes that our theory of validity T is recursively axiomatizable. McGee defends the assumption thus:
5
[i]f . . . we identify the [validities] as those statements from whose denials one can derive a contradiction, and if we take derivability to be provability is some explicitly describable system of rules, it will follow that the set of necessary truths is a recursively enumerable set. (McGee 1991: 44-5) 
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In short: if Val(01) is true iff : 7 T o, for some recursively axiomatizable T, then the set of validities is recursively enumerable. It then follows from Corollary 12 that VD must fail. Moreover, as McGee (1991: 45) ' (McGee 1991: 45) . Yet, it is doubtful that the claim that validity is recursively axiomatizable can be made plausible in the present context. For one thing, the claim is not available to someone who 20 accepts the validity of arguments with infinitely many premises, such as the example of Section 2. 20 For another, McGee's argument for the recursive axiomatizability of validity fails to convince. The argument assumes that, if is valid, then we can derive a contradiction from :. But since to derive o from : is to (classically) prove , this is tantamount to assuming a form of 25 verificationism, to the effect that validities must have proofs of a certain kind. This is implausible, however.
To begin with, Goldbach's Conjecture could be true but (absolutely) unprovable. It would then follow that, since one would not be able to derive o from the negation of Goldbach's Conjecture, Goldbach's 30 Conjecture, unlike, say, Fermat's Theorem, or some other provable arithmetical theorem, would be invalid in the target sense. This seems counterintuitive, though. Since both Goldbach's Conjecture and Fermat's Theorem are arithmetical sentences, it would seem that either they are both valid or neither is. 21 Second, even if all mathematical truths are absolutely provable, the set of 35 absolutely provable sentences would still not be guaranteed to be recursively enumerable. For example, perhaps every mathematical truth is absolutely provable by some possible finite being or other, even if no possible finite being can give absolute proofs of all mathematical truths.
22
In any event, the claim that validity is recursively axiomatizable is itself problematic. The claim implies that Val(x) can be interpreted as Prov T (x), 5 which in turn implies, because of Lo¨b's Theorem, that our theory of validity cannot assert that valid sentences are true, on pain of triviality. Yet, we would seem to know that validity is a mode of truth. As Reinhardt (1986: 468-9) puts it in the case of knowledge, 'we know that what is known is true, but the reason for this is that if it were not so we would not call it known'. 10 The point, I take it, carries over to validity. McGee (1991: 45-9) This reasoning also fails to convince. In effect, McGee is here merging together two different issues: the question whether validity is paradoxical and the problem how the validity paradoxes should be solved. While it may be that V-Out has obscured (L) to view, the point remains that V-Out 30 is intuitively obvious: more obvious, I submit, than the assumption that validity is recursively axiomatizable. We may eventually revert to a recursively axiomatizable theory of validity, as McGee suggests, and invalidate V-Out. But this would be a reaction to the validity paradoxes: the recursive axiomatizability of the set of validities, and the subsequent invalidation of 35 V-Out, would not be one of our initial assumptions.
It might be insisted that validity cannot be paradoxical on the grounds that 'the notion of validity is to be . . . defined in set-theory' (Field 2008: 298) and that, since set-theory is consistent, so must be validity. This argument clearly would not work, however. For if it were legitimate to assume that 40 validity is model-theoretically definable in order to show that there are no 22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
the inexpressibility of validity | 13 paradoxes of validity, then it would also be legitimate to assume that truth is model-theoretically definable in order to show that there are no paradoxes of truth. That truth-in-L and validity L can be defined in set-theory by no means imply that there are no paradoxes of truth and validity.
Still, it might be thought that there are independent reasons to assume that validity is classical, which again would imply that validity cannot be a paradoxical notion. To see this, notice that, if validity is classical, then the following disjunction would hold: (D) 6 Val(01,0o1) _:6:Val(01,0o1).
10
It is now easy to check that both disjuncts are incompatible with VD. The second entails
which effectively says that an instance of VD is invalid. As for the first, given VD, it immediately entails o. (b) that it would seem to be somewhat detrimental to the role of logic as regulator of reasoning if we were unable to say that any given piece of reasoning is either valid or not valid.
He concludes that 'these considerations together seem to . . . make the assumption that validity claims obey excluded middle a reasonable working 25 hypothesis' (Field, 2008: 307) . Both (a) and (b), though, validate parallel arguments against the claim that truth is paradoxical. Ad (i), if logic is a guide for correct reasoning and if, as Field supposes, only a simple logic can serve such a purpose, then reasoning in classical or intuitionistic logic is arguably simpler than reasoning in any weakening of these logics. But it 30 would be too quick to conclude that one direction of the T-Scheme should fail on the grounds that assuming excluded middle for truth claims leads to simpler reasoning about truth. Certainly this argument would not be available to Field, who has long been advocating a non-classical, paracomplete logic of paradox (Field 2003 (Field , 2007 (Field , 2008 . Ad (ii), a parallel argument would
35
conclude that it would be detrimental to the role of truth as a regulator of assertion if we were unable to say that any given sentence is either true or not true. Either way, it would then follow that truth must be a classical notion and that, for this reason, at least one direction of the T-Scheme must fail. But this would hardly be a reason for thinking that the Liar reasoning is not 40 paradoxical.
Concluding remarks
I have argued that we have reasons-largely epistemic ones-for countenancing a broader notion of validity, alongside logical validity. Such a notion is no more, and no less, paradoxical than truth. As John Myhill puts it, com-5 menting on the notion of absolute provability (a kind of validity):
the situation is completely analogous to that Epimendes paradox which arises when we try to formalize the notion of truth, and does not show the notion of [absolute] provability to be any more paradoxical than the notion of truth. (Myhill 1960: 470) 10
The paradoxes of validity are generalizations of the truth-theoretic paradoxes. The Knower Paradox is but a stronger Liar, and v-Curry is, in turn, a generalization of the Knower, one that employs stronger, though equally compelling, validity principles, as well as weaker logical resources. Consequently, validity gives rise to stronger indefinability and inexpressibil-
15
ity results: the standardly assumed structure of the validity relation suffices to make validity indefinable and, if Q is sound, inexpressible. 
